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estimates for the post—OPEC period 1974—79 imply that each extra dollar of
domestic saving increases domestic investment by approximately 85 cents in a
sample of 17 OECD countries.
An explicit analysis of the problems of identification and simulta-
neous equations bias suggests that the regression estimates are more relevant as
a guide to the long—run response of international capital flows than to their
short—run behavior. Coefficient estimates based on annual variations in savings
and investment are subject to potentially severe simultaneous equations bias
that is not present when annual observations are averaged over a decade or more
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sented in the paper indicates that the short—run change in the rate of net
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likely to be substantially greater than the ultimate steady state response.
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A nearly universal assumption in international economic analysis is that
capital flows freely ang countries to keep the return to capital equal in all
places. The implications of this assumption of perfect capital mDbility are not
only extremely important but are also contrary to most economists' beliefs about
the behavior of national economies. Perfect capital mobility implies, for
example, that the burden of corporate income taxes falls primarily on labor, that
government deficits do not crowd out private investment, that increases in saving
do not raise domestic investment, and that monetary and tax policies cannot alter
the real net rate of return on domestic capital. To avoid such intellectual schi-
zophrenia, we must either nodify the assumption of perfect capital mobility or
abandon the view that national monetary and fiscal policies that alter domestic
saving can thereby influence the process of domestic capital formation.
An alternative view of the international econoxxr recognizes that capi-
tal mobility is less perfect. Capital tends to flow in the direction of higher
returns but risk considerations, institutional barriers and government policies
impede that flow. For private lenders and portfolio investors, foreign stocks
andbond are a very imperfect substitute for domestic securities. The profita-
bility of foreign direct investment reflects not only the factor proportions in
the host country but also firm-specific considerations of marketing, tariff
barriers,tax rules, etc. Foreign direct investment also involvespolitical
risksthat are fundamentally different from investing in the home country.
*Harvard University and National Bureau of Economic Research. This paper
waspresented at the NBER—EHESSInternationalSeminar on Macroeconomics in
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onProductivity and Industrial Change in the World Economy. I am grateful to
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071582—2—
Further, government policies may seek to encourage or prevent capital inflows or
outflows during long periods of time. These restrictions on perfect capital
mobility imply thatnationaleconomic policies that affect domestic saving can
also influence domestic capital formation.
In an earlier paper, Charles Horioka and I presented a direct test of
the perfect capital nbi1ity assumption (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980). We
reasoned that with perfect capital mobility there should be no relation between
a country's domestic saving rate and its domestic rate of Investment. Instead,
a sustained increase in saving in any one country should add funds to the world
capital market. These funds would then be divided among countries in a way that
depends on the relative size of each country's initial capital stock and the
elasticityof its marginal efficiency of capital schedule. it that does not
depend on which country did the additional saving.
We used data for the industrial countries that aremembersofthe
Organizationfor Fsonomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to test this impli-
cation of perfect capital nxbility. We showed first that there are substantial
differences in domestic saving rates among these countries and that these dif-
ferences remain stable over a long period of time. We then estimated regression
equations relating the ratio of danestic investment to gross domestic product as
the dependent variable to the ratio of domestic saving to GDP as the Independent
variable. To reduce the impact of cyclical variations and random shocks, both
variables were averaged over a minimum of five years.
The evidence overwhelmingly rejected the implication of perfect capi-
tal mobility. The relation between the investment ratio and the savings ratio
is significantly different from zero in every period that we examined at signi-
ficance levels that were always less than 0.001. Indeed, the coefficients were—3—
always greaterthan 0.85 and thin two standard errors of 1.0. The conclusion
wasunavoidable that, contrary to the implication of the perfect capital mobi-
lityassumption, a sustained increase in the domestic saving ratio caused an
almost equal increase in the domestic investment ratio.
The Feldstein—Horioka analysis explicitly assumed that intercountry
differences in savings rates are caused by differences in demographic structure,
population growth rates and social security retirement income programs. This
specification, based on earlier york by Modigliani (1970) and Feldstein (1977),
permitted using a simultaneous equations approach to estimating the investment
equation with the savings ratio treated as endogenous. These estimates con-
firmed the ordinary least squares results.1
The findings of the Feldstein—Horioka study should not however be
overinterpreted. They do not imply that there is no capital mobility nor that
there is no tendency of capital to shift toward countries where it can earn a
high after—tax rate of return.2 Strictly interpreted, the Feldstein—Horioka
paper only claims to be a test of the extreme hypothesis of perfect capital
mobility. More generally, however, it is reasonable to interpret the
Feldstein—Horioka findings as evidence that there are substantial imperfections
in the international capital market and that a very large share of domestic
savings tends to remain in the home country. This implies further that
1The Feldstein—Horiokapaper also reported several other tests that will not
be repeated here, e.g., adding variables measuring country size and openness to
the investment equation. Section 3 of the present paper returns to the problem
of simultaneity.
2Frisch (1981) and Hartman (1981) present some evidence that investment fLows
aresensitive to after—tax rates of return._14_
sustained government deficits do reduce domestic capital formation and that cor-
porate income taxes can reduce the net return tocapital.3
The Feldstein—Horioka study used data for the fifteen year period from
1960 through 1971k. The sample period ended just as the dramatic 1973 OPEC price
increase hadbegunto alter substantially the current account deficits of the
industrial nations and therefore the international flow of capital. Government
interference with international capital movements was also reduced in some
countries in the 1970s; the United States, for example, ended its interest
equalization tax on foreign borrowing in the United States in 197I and reduced
the pressure on U.S. nultinationals to finance overseas investment by borrowing
abroad.
One major purpose of the present study is to extend the sample period
to theend of the 1970s. The evidence presented in section 1confirms that the
secondhalf of the 1970s was a period of substantially greater international
capital flows. Nevertheless, the earlier finding that international differences
in saving rates are associated with nearly equal differences in investment rates
interpret Harberger (1980) as essentially accepting this interpretation.
In an earlier paper (Harberger, 1978), he argued that international capital
markets were essentially perfect and therefore thatratesof return are
equalized internationally just as "water seeks its own level." But byhis 1980
paper,Harberger concludes: "My ownintuitiondoes not want to accept the notion
that increments of investment activity are in all or nearly all countries effec-
tively 100 percent "financed" by funds flowing in from abroad, and that incre-
ments in saving simply spill out into the world capital markets. I find the
analor to a hydraulic system with perhaps a viscous fluid, in which the pipes
are partially clogged, and in which some vessels are separated by semipermeable
membranes, to be nore consonant with imjimageof the world than the alternative
analog to a hydraulic system where the water flows freely through the system
and, essentially instantaneously, finds the same level everywhere."(p.. 336).
Ifthat flow is slow enough, so that the tendency toward equalization imist be
measured in decades rather than months or even years, any relevant analysis zaist
regard the capital novements as incomplete and rates of return as potentially
unequal.—5--
isreconfirmed. There is no more support for the perfect capital mobility
hypothesis in the regression estimates for l974 through 1919 than there was in
the previous fifteen years.
Since net foreign investment is equal to the difference between
domestic savings arid domestic investment, the strong association between
domestic investment and domestic savings iniplies that there is only a weak asso-
ciation between net foreign investment and domestic savings. The empirical ana-
lysis presented in section 2 decomposes net foreign investment and examines the
relation between each of the major components of net foreign investment and the
domestic saving rate. A different type of decomposition is suggested by the
essential equality of net foreign investment and the current account surplus.
Section 2 also examines the relation between the components of the current
account balance and the domestic saving rate. Neither of these analyses
suggests any change in the basic conclusion about the long—run independence of
international capital flows from domestic savings rates.
Since domestic savings and domestic investment are parts of an inter-
dependent economic system, the regression of investment ratios on savings ratios
raises problems of estimation and interpretation. Section 3 discusses the
issues of identification and estimation with the help of a minimal theoretical
model of investment, savings and international capital flows. The analysis
indicates why cross—country data averaged over substantial periods are likely to
be a much nxre reliable basis for testing the hypothesis of perfect capital
mobility and for estimating structural paranenters than time series data for
individual countries.
Section 1 then examines an explicit idel of portfolio choice that
shows why sustained changes in domestic savings may have only a small effect on—6-.
netforeign investment in the long run and yet may also have a more substantial
effect on capital flows in the short run.
There is a brief concluding section that comments on some of the
limitations of the current paper and that suggests direction for future
research.
1. The Effect of Saving on Domestic Investment
The basic data for the present analysis are the ratios of investment
to GDP and savings to GDP for 17 OECD countries.These ratios are calculated
using the current dollar magnitudes published by the OECD (1981) and therefore
adjusted by the OECD to a common set of statistical definitions.
Table 1 presents the values of the saving and investment ratios and of
the differences between them. All of the figures refer to gross investment and
saving. The first three columns show the ian values of these ratios for each
country in the 15 year period from 1960 through l97. The comparable ratios
for the post—OPEC years 1975 through 1979 are shown in the next three columns.
These figures show a striking increase in the absolute differences
between the domestic savings rate and the domestic investment rate. In the fif-
teen years ending in 197k, the difference between the average savings ratio and
the average investment ratio ranged from —0.030 (in Greece) to 0.018 (in the
Netherlands) with a mean of 0.007 and a standard deviation of 0.016. In
contrast, in the second half of the 1970s the range was from _O.012 (in Finland)
The other seven OECD countries had to be excluded from the sample because
consistent data are not available for the entire period.
5'rhese ratios differ from the ratios presented in Table 1 of Feldstein and
Horioka (1980) only because of data revisions.—7—
Table 1
Savings and Investment Ratios in OECD Countries
Mean Values, 1960—Ti4 Mean Values, 1975—79
S IS_I S I S I
Y TT y
Australia 0.2i45 0.267 —0.022 0.2170.231 o.oil4
Austria 0.287 0.28)4 0.003 0.250 0.267 —0.017
Belgium 0.233 0.224 0.009 0.2010.215 —o.oii4
Canada 0.218 0.231 —0.013 0.2090.235 —0.026
Denmark 0.220 0.2)48 —0.028 0.19)40.228 —0.03)4
Finland 0.288 0.3060.024 0.2760.318 —0.0)42
France 0.251 0.250 0.001 0.2290.232 —0.003
Germany 0.270 0.262 0.008 0.2290.222 0.007
Greece 0.222 0.252 —0.030 0.2)470.276 —0.029
Ireland 0.197 0.225 —0.028 0.23)40.272 —0.038
Italy 0.237 0.227 0.010 0.221 0.21)4 0.007
Japan 0.366 0.358 0.008 0.3050.317 —0.012
Netherlands 0.28)4 0.266 0.018 0.269 0.215 0.054
New Zealand 0.230 0.255 —0.025 0.2050.275 —0.070
Sweden 0.2)43 0.2)41 0.002 0.1950.211 —0.016
United Kingdom 0.189 0.193 —0.00)4 0.1770.190 —0.013
United States0.188 0.188 0.000 0.1710.179 —o.oo8
Source: "National Accounts of the OECD Countries: 1950—1979, OECD, 1981.
SLYisgrossdomesticsavings divided by GDP.
i/Y is gross domestic investment divided by GDP.—8—
to 0.0514 (in the Netherlands) with a ianof—o.oi6 and a standard deviation of
0.025.
For virtually every industrial country, the second half of the l9TOs
represented a time when domestic investment exceeded domestic savings. This In
turn implied that net foreign investment wasnegativeand therefore that the
current account was in deficit. The negative net foreign Investment for the
industrial countries as a whole in these years was largely a reflection of the
higher prices being paid for imported oil and the resulting surpluses of the
OPEC countries.
Despite the substantial increase in the size and variability of inter-
national capital flows, the second half of the l9TOs showed the same strong ten-
dency for countries with high domestic savings rates to have high rates of
domestic investment. Table 2 presents estimates of the basic investment
equation:
Ii r ____ = I+ (1) LJ
wherei Is domestic investment in country i, Si is domestic savings, Y1is
GDP, and c is a random disturbance. The equation is estimated with the sample
of 17 countries listed in Table 1 and with the investment and savings ratios
averaged over several different subperiods as well as for the entire 20 year
period from 1960 through 1979.
Theestimate for the second halt of the 1970s indicates that an addi-
tional "dollar" (pound, franc, mark, etc) of domestic saving raised domestic—9—
investmentby 0.865 dollars with a standard error of0.185.6Comparison with
the other subperiods indicates that the response of investment to savings was at
least as high in this final period as in any of the earlier periods. This was
—2
true even though, as the lower B implies, there was more "unpredictable"
variation in domestic investment during this period.7
For the 20 year period as a whole, each extra "dollar" of saving was
associated with 0.796 additional dollars of investment. With a standard error
of 0.112, this is clearly significantly different from zero at any relevant pro-
bability level. The alternative null hypothesis, i.e., that the coefficient of
SlYis1.0, can be rejected at a probability level of 10 percent, implying that
capital does tend to flow to countries with low savings rates although certainly
much less than perfect capital mobility would imply.
The first five equations reported in Table 2 refer to gross saving and
gross investment. Since capital accumulation depends on net investment, it is
interesting to consider also the relation between net investment and net saving.
Since this requires subtracting an estimate of depreciation from both variables,
any error in measuring depreciation will tend to bias the estimated coefficient
toward one. This potential bias is consistent with the result presented in the
sixth equation of Table 2 that shows a coefficient of 0.99 for the regression of
the net investment ratio on the net savings rate.
6 . Ifthe equation is estimated in level form rather than ratio form, the coef-
ficient is very close to one but this reflects the pure scale effect. Only
ratio equations are therefore presented in this paper.
TThese differences in domestic investment reflected such things as differen-
cesin the response of profitability and of capacity utilization to the 1973
OPEC shock and to the rising rates of inflation.—10—
Table2
The Relation Between Domestic Savings
Ratios and Domestic Investment Ratios
Sample —2
Equation Period Definition Constant SLY R
1 1975—79 gross o.046 0.865 0.57
(0.042)(0.185)
2 1970_714 gross 0.048 0.826 0.73
(0.033) (0.125)
3 1970—79 gross 0.047 0.843 0.67
(0.036)(o.i46)
4 1960—69 gross 0.059 0.779 0.82
(0.022) (0.090)
5 1960—79 gross 0.057 0.796 0.75
(0.028) (0.112)
6 1960—79 net 0.011 0.993 0.83
(0.016) (0.111)
7 1970—79 gross; 0.039 0.886 0.79
derived (0.027) (0.112)
The coefficients refer to equation 1 in the text. Standard errors are
shown in parentheses. The "gross" equations relate gross investment
and saving while the "net" equation relates net investment and saving.—11—
Ifthere were no problems of measuring savings, investment and inter-
national transactions, the difference between gross domestic savings and gross
domestic investment would be equal to the balance on current account (CA). This
suggests that, instead of using the conventional national income account measure
of domestic savings, the value of gross domestic savings could be defined as the
8
sumofgross domestic investment and the current account balance: S =I+CA.
The basic equation is reestimated for the decade of the 1970s with this derived
measure of savings and presented in the final line of Table 2. The coefficient
of 0.886 is only slightly higher than the previous estimate of 0.8143 for this
decade and show that this source of measurement error does not influence the
basic result.
The estimation of equation 1 with a cross section of country averages
implicitly assumes that each country's disturbance is purely random and uncorre—
lated with the savings ratio. If country investment rates do differ systemati-
cally for some reason that is not directly related to the savings ratio,
equation 1 should be replaced by an equation in which the constant term is
allowed to differ among countries:
__ ___ + (2)
If equation 2 is the correct specification but equation 1 is estimated, the
coefficient ofwill be biased if is correlated with the savings ratio.
This potential source of bias can be eliminated by extending the ana-
lysis to twoobservationsfor each country so that the constant values of the
8This is the procedure used by Sachs(198la).—12—
czjs can be eliminated. If equation 2 is generalized by assuming thatall
investment ratios may shift by a constant amount iS between times t and t', the
new specification may be written9:
'it 'it' s.t s.t, _______— _______ = 6+ 1
— 1 +— cj,.
Yit Yit, I Yit,
j
Definingthe latter period as 1973 through 1979 (i.e., the years affected by the
OPEC price shock) and the earlier period as the previous seven "pre—OPEC" years
implies an estimate ofof 1.0214 with a standard error of 0.227 and an estimate
of 6 of 0.013 with a standard error of 0.005. The for this equation is
0.55. Thus countries that increased their saving between the earlier period and
the later period found that their investment increased on average by an equal
amount between the two dates. There is certainly no support in this estimate
for the view that increases in saving merely augmented the total world supply of
funds and that such capital was allocated among countries in unconstrained pur—
10
suit of the highest rate of return.
An alternative method of estimating equation 2 is to use each of the
annual observations in a pooled cross—section of time series. Using data for
the entire 20 year period11 implies an estimate of 0.771 for with a standard
9Although the uj'S are eliminated by first differencing in this way, they can
be estimated in a second step onceand iS are estimated. The procedure is
exactly equivalent to estimations with individual constant terms and two obser-
vations for each country.
10The use of differences in saving and investment ratios may cause sinulta—
neous equations bias that is not present in the estimates of Table 2. This is
discussed in section 3.
Some individual annual observations are missing, reducing the sample
to 320 observations.—13—
error of 0.0146, very similar to the estimate of 0.796 shown in ble 2 and
obtained whentheannual data areaveragedto produce a single value for each
country.
The similarity of the estimates with individual constant termsand
with averaged data suggests that including the individual constant terms
has little effect on the estimate of 8.This is confirmed when equation 1is
reestimated with individual annual observations for all countries for the twenty
year period. The estimate of 8 is 0.791 witha standarderror of 0.031, vir-
tually identical to the estimates in ¶Lble 2.
The use of individual annual observations makes it possible to esti-
mate a more general dynamic relation between savings and investment. When a
lagged value of the savings ratio is added to the basic specification, its coef-
ficient is relatively small and negative:
S. Si, 1 = 0.0714+0.832
it
—0.109 . (14)
Yit (0.033) 'it (0.033) t_i
=0.68
The negative coefficient of the lagged savings variable suggests that investment
doesnot adjust to savings gradually but overadjusts at first. The coefficients
of further lagged values are smaller and not statistically significant.
Finally, usingthe annual observations to estimate the average effect of year to








Thus,even year to year increases in saving tend on average to be associated
with increases in domestic investment in the saving country by approximately
12
equal amounts.
2. Domestic Savings and the Components of International Capital Flows
The basic investment equation can be rewritten in terms of net foreign
investmentand then used to analyze the relation between saving and the com-
ponents of international capital flows. More specifically, subtractingthe
savings ratio from both sides of equation 1 and multiplying by minus one yields
S]• —Ij=—a+(1—8) — (6)
Yi Yi
Thenational income accounts divide the excess of domestic saving over domestic
investment into net foreign investment (NFl) plus the statistical discrepancy in
the savings—investment account(SDS).13 Substituting this into equation 6
implies:
NFl1 =— + (1—8)Si
— SDS+•• (T)
Yi Yi Yi
IfSDS/Y were uncorrelated with the savings ratio, the estimate of
8obtained from equation7 wouldbe exactly the same as the estimate obtained
from equation 1. In fact, there is a small postive association between the sta—
12Sections3and 1 show that the similarity of the coefficients based on long—
termaverages and annual changes may be subject to different interpretations.
13The net foreign investment of the United States thus represents the net
investment abroad financed by savings in the United States.—15—
tistical discrepency ratio and the saving ratio in the sample, implying that the
estimate ofimplied by estimating equation 7 with the decade averages of NFI/Y




Yi (0.002) (0.785) Yi
The implied value ofis 0.908 andthereforeslightly higher than the estimate
presented in Table 2. The coefficient of 0.092 implies that each extra "dollar"
of domestic saving causes a capital export of approximately 9 cents but the very
large standard error indicates that there is no statistically significant rela-
tion at all between net foreign investment and the domestic savings rate.1
Net foreign investment can itself be decomposed into the four major
components of the international capital account (direct investment; portfolio
investment; other long—term capital flows; and short—term capital flows) plus
the total change in official reserves, the net errors and omissions, and a
remaining minor category of the official settlements balance. The lack of a
significant or substantial relation between domestic savings and net foreign
investment as a whole could in principal reflect a balancing of positive and
negative relationships among different components. For example, portfolio
investment outflows might respond positively to the domestic savings rate only
to be offset by changes in official reserves.
In fact, in each of the separate regressions, the coefficient of the
savings ratio is always less than its standard error. There is no indication of
ll4Theimichlarger standard error in equation 8 than in Th.ble 2 reflects the
importanceofthe statistical discrepancy.—16—
a relation between sustained differences aung countries in savings rates and any
ofthe components of net foreign investment.
Net foreign investment is conceptually equal to the balance on current
account.'5 Thissuggests another decomposition that might be useful in analyzing
the effect of intercountry savingsdifferences.16The relation between the
current account balance and the savings ratio can be decomposed into the
separate effects of savings on: merchandise exports; nrchandise imports; other
credits for goods, services and investment income; other debits for goods, ser-
vices and investment income; private unrequited transfers; and public unrequited
transfers. None of the six regression coefficients relating a current account
component as a fraction of GD? to savings as a fraction of GD? had an absolute
value as large as 0.1 and none was as large as its standard error. The lack of
a significant relationship between the current account balance and savings
reflects a lack of relation between each of its components and savings.
In short, the two decompositions that have been examined confirm the
finding of section 1 that there is no relation between sustained differences in
domestic savings rates and the external position of the country.
3. Parameter Identification and Estimation with Cross—Country and Time Series Data
The regression of the domestic Investment ratio on the domestic
savings ratio is an intuitively appealing test of the hypothesis of perfect
151n practice, the two numbers differ because of such things as the allocation
of special drawingrightsand the statistical treatment of gold, extraordinary
military transactions, etc.
l6Thjs analysis wassuggestedto me by Douglas Purvis.—17—
capital nobility. Nevertheless, there are fundamental problems of iden-
tification and estimation that should be considered when it is recognized that
both savings and investment are endogenous variables in an economic system.
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) discussed the problem of simultaneous equations
bias briefly and suggested that this was likely to be nuch less serious in esti-
mates based on cross—country data averaged over long periods of time than in
estimates based on annual time series for individual countries. As I noted in
the introduction to the present paper, instrumental variable estimates suggested
by a simultaneous equations model confirmed the ordinary least squares results.
The current section presents an explicit model and uses it to assess
the regression of domestic investment on domestic saving as a test of the per-
fect capital mmbility bypothesis and, when international capital mobility is
less than perfect, as an estimate of the effect on domestic investment of endo—
genous shifts in domestic saving.
The simplest del that is adequate for this purpose requires a
domestic investment function, a domestic savings function, a net foreign invest-
ment function, and a savings—investment equilibrium condition. I shall assume
that all investment is financed by issuing bonds and that the demand for gross
domestic investment (I) can be written as a function of the domestic real
interest rate (r)plusa random shock (u):
I=+(r)+u (9)
with•'< 0.A similar specification of the domestic savings function
S=(r)+v (10)—18—
provides that the supply of saving is a nondecreasing function of the real
interest rate (ip' 0) plus a random shock.
Writing N for net foreign investment (i.e., the net outflow of capital
from the home country), the net capital outflow in response to a higher interest
rate can be 'written:
N =n(r)+e (ii)
where '(r)0 implies that a higher real domestic interest rate reduces (or
leaves unchanged if n'=0)net foreign investment (or causes a greater net
inflow from abroad, i.e., a negative net foreign investment) and e is a random
shock. Perfect capital mobility implies that n'=—. Moregenerally, r' could
differ between the short—run and the long—run and could vary amongcountriesor
time periods. Some reasons for such differences are discussed below.
Equilibrium in the goods rket requires that domestic saving equal
domestic investment plus net foreign investment:1T
S=I+N (12)
These four equations determine values for the four endogenous variables I, S, N
and r as functions of the three random distributions u, v and e.
Substituting 9, 10 and 11 in 12 yields:
4(r) +v=• (r)+u+n(r) +e. (13)
1T1 asimple theoretical model, this is equivalent to the equilibrium con-
dition S=I+X—Mwhere X is exports and M is imports since net foreign
investment equals the current account surplus.—19—
Differentating and solving for the change in the real interest rate implies:
dr= du—dv+de (i4)
—4,'—
Since')0, 4,' <0and n' 0, the denominator is unambiguously positive.
Thus the interest rate rises when there is a positive shock to domestic invest-
ment demand (du >0)or to the domestic demand for net foreign investment (de > 0).
The effect of investment and savings shocks on net foreign investment




Tointerpret equation 15, recall that dN > 0 means an increased capital outflow
and that n'(0.Thus an increase in domestic savings (dv > 0) causes an
increase in net foreign investment and therefore both a capital outflow and a
current account surplus. With perfect capital mobility, n'= — anddN/dv =1;
in this case, all of the additional domestic saving goes abroad. Similarly,
even with a finite value of n',anincrease in domestic investment (du > 0)
causes a decrease in net foreign investment and therefore both a capital inflow
and a current account deficit.
This brief description of the international effects of shifts in
domestic savings and investment has ignored the exchange rate novments that are
likely to occur as part of the process of change. An autonomous increase in
l8Thj$ is the case discussed by Sachs (l981a, 1981b). I will return to his
empirical results later in this section.—20—
domestic investment demand (or decrease in savings) will raise the domestic
interest rate and cause a real appreciation of the home currency. With this
increase in the exchange rate there is a current account deficit that accomoda—
tes the capital inflow. The model is consistent with this exchange rate beha-
vior even though the exchange rate is not explicitly modelled.
Combining equations 9 and 11t shows the relation between domestic
investment and a shift in domestic savings:





With perfect capital mobility, n' =—and dI/dv =0.At the other extreme, if
international capital movements do not respond to the interest rate, n' =0and
dl=_______. (i8)
dv
Since 4)' <0and 4"0, in this case dI/dv 1.If 4" is "small" relative to
—4)', i.e., if the interest elasticity of savings is small relative to the
interest elasticity of investment, dI/dv will be close to 1.
Now that the theoretical relation between domestic saving and invest-
ment has been clarified it is possible to examine more explicitly the interpre—
tation of the regression coefficient estimated by regressing the investment
ratio on the savings ratio, i.e., the coefficient of equation 1 estimated to be
approximately one in the cross—country regressions reported in Table 2. Theregression coefficient of equation 1
investment and saving divided by the
savings can beapproximatedin terms
First, differentiate equation 10 and
to obtain
—21—
isthe ratio of the covariance between
variance of saving. The variance of
of the current model in the following way.
eliminate dr with the help of equation 114
Now evaluate each of the derivatives at the mean value of the corresponding
variable, square both sides, and take expectations. Since the expected value of







(11)' — — 2nt)
Similarly, combining equations 16and19 yields an approximation for the co—
variance between S and I:
a31 = E(dS dl)
E [—(4i'-i-ri')dv +i'(du+de))[(4'—n')du —•'(dv—de)]
(ii' — —
(21)
—a )+ vv ev
a—o +a —a ij' ( p_' )( a+aue) —II)'+'uv ue ye ee
(,t— —
*' [du—dv-s-de] dS =__________________
— 4,? — + dv. (19)—22—
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With the help of equation 22, we can now consider two questions.
First, what is the implication of perfect capital nbi1ity for the estimated
coefficient 8? Second, what is the relation between the estimated coefficient
8 and the effect on domestic investment of a shift in domestic saving (dI/dv)?
3.1 Testing the Perfect Capital Mobility Hypothesis
With perfect capital mobility, r'= —and 22 implies that
.
8—UV (23)
Thus perfect capital mobility is consistent with a positive parameter estimate
only to the extent that the exogenous shifts in saving and investment are posi-
tively correlated. The likely magnitude of the correlation between savings and
investment shifts depends on the nature of the data.
With time series observations for an individual country, d.nand shocks
could well make > 0. A downturn in economic activity might cause savings to
be relatively low (because consumption depends on permanent income) and might
also cause investment to be relatively low (because of low capacity
utilization). Similarly, a supply shock that lowers income and profitability
might also reduce both saving and Investment. In either' of these cases, the
regression coefficient 8 could be positive and substantial even if there is per——23—
fect capital mobility. Conversely time series data for an individual country
could also have < 0; an exogenous temporary increase in the propensity to
save (dv > 0) could reduce aggregate output and thereby induce a decline in
investment (du < 0). Estimates of based on time series data for a single
country are thus an unreliable basis for evaluating the hypothesis of perfect
international capital mobility.19
In contrast, when the sample is a cross—section of countries and the
observations for each country are averaged over a long period of time, there is
no reason to expect any correlations between intercountry differences in the exo-
genous component of saving and in the exogenous component of investment. These
intercountry saving differences reflect such things as the demographic structure
of the population, the extent to which unfunded social security substitutes for
private saving, the average level of government deficits, consumer credit and
mortgage arrangements, and the long—term rise in income since current retirees
were working and saving. Sustained differences in investment rates that are not
just a reflection of savings differences (through the effect of saving on the
cost of capital) reflect such things as business tax rules and the effects of
unions on profitability. The intercountry variance in exogenous investment
shifts is thus likely to be smaller than the intercountry variance in exogenous
saving shifts (atr < a) and the covariance between the two is likely to be
small or zero. If there is a nonzero covariance, there appears to be no pre-
sumption about its sign.
'9Feldstein and Horioka estimated time—series regressions for individual
countries and presented the results in NBER Working Paper No. 310 but did not
include these time series estimates in the published version (Feldstein and
Horioka, 1980) because we concluded that the problem of simultaneous equations
basmeant that these individual country coefficients could not be interpreted
as estimates of the effect on investment of exogenous changes in saving.—2L—
Equation 23 shows that the estimated values of 8 presented in Table 2
are not consistent with perfect capital mobility if is zero or negative.
Moreover, even if there is a positive covariance between exogenous savings dif-
ferences and exogenous investment differences, the high values of the estimated
8's are not consistent with perfect capita1 mobility if the variance of the
savings shifts (a) is large relative to the variance of the investment shifts




where p is the corelat ion between u and v. Since p ( 1, with perfect capital
mobility B is at most equal to the ratio of the standard deviation of the
investment shifts to the standard deviation of the savings shifts. Since the
observed estimates of B are approximately one, equation 214 shows that the evi-
dence is not consistent with both perfect capital mobility and a low ratio of
auu/ avv.
it is easily shown that with perfect capital mobility the correlation
between savings and investment is the same as the correlation between u and
perfect capital mobility, the regression of saving on investment pro-
duces a coefficient equal to =°'%• Multiplythis by =
ouv/avv
from equation 23 and note that BIsBsI =uv/0uu0
=2uv't the product of
a regression coefficient and the coefficient for the reverse regression is equal
to the squared correlation; i.e., Bis8si =is'Thus P218 =—25—
The observed correlations between saving and investment (i.e., the square root
of the R2 values reported in Table 2) imply implausibily high correlations bet-
ween the exogenous components of saving and investment.
In short, the identifying restriction in cross—country data that
uv0 or that issmallissufficient topermit interpreting the
observedregressions of investment on savings presented in Table 2 as strong
evidence against perfect capital mobility. Alternatively, the restriction that
the correlation between exogenous saving and investment differences is not
greater than 0.5 also implies rejection of the perfect capital nobility hypothesis.
Estimates of 8 based on a cross—country sample of changes in invest-
ment and saving provides a different type of evidence against the hypothesis of
perfect capital mobility. In such a regression, any association between the
levels of exogenous saving and investment effects is irrelevant. Instead,
in equation 23 must be interpreted as a relation between shifts in saving
and shifts in investment. If countries in which the exogenous component of
saving has increased between two dates (or two periods) tend to be those
countries in which the exogenous component of investment has also increased,
>0and the estimate ofcan be high even if there is perfect capital mobi-
lity. The danger of this covariance being large Is greatest when the data can
reflect changes from one phase of a business cycle to the next.It is
reassuring therefore that the estimate of 8 =l.O1based on the changes in
saving and investment reflected a comparison of two periods of six years
(1968—73 and l97—8O) and that similar results were obtained by Feldstein and
Horioka for a different set of years (8 =O.T21with a standard error of 0.158
based on the changes for 1960—69 to 197O_T1).21
the 1968—73 to l97I_8O comparison is influenced by the OPEC—induced
slowdown, the comparison based on the earlier pair of periods is not biased by a
supply shock.—26—
3.2 Estimating dI/dv
Under what plausible conditions does the estimate of B based on
equation 1 represent the effect on domestic investment of a shift in the exoge-.
nous factors influencing saving? Equivalently, when does the value of B given
in equation 22 equal the value of dI/dv shown in equation 17? And, more
generally, even when exact identification is not achieved, does B tend to dI/dv
as certain limiting conditions are achieved?
Consider first the case in which saving rates are not sensitive to
the interest rate (4i' =0)and in which the exogenous differences in saving
among countries are not correlated with exogenous differences in the domestic
investment function or the net foreign investment function (a =0ve
=0).In
this case, equations 22 and 17 ii1y that B = = dI/dvand there is no
simultaneous equation bias.22
Although these assumptions maynothold exactly, they may be a reaso-
nable approximation for cross—country data based on averages over extended
periods. In this context, the interest elasticities of domestic investment may
be high relative to the interest elasticity of domestic savings. Similarly, the
variance of domestic savings may be large relative to the covariance between
exogenous savings differences and exogenous differences in investment and net
foreign capital. The value of B in equation 22 tends to dI/dv as
and ave/ayy all tend to zero.
An alternative specification places no restriction on the interest
sensitivity of domestic savings but posits that the exogenous differences among
22The assumptions of 4i' =0and ave =a
=0make the model recursive
with respect to S and therefore makes ordinary least squares an unbiased
estimator.—27—
countries in saving rates are large relative to the exogenous differences in
domestic and foreign investment: thus and aee/v are both small and
therefore auvla.vy, cevovy and uevv are also small. Taking the limit as
a, grows relative to the other variances and covariances implies that 8tends
to 4'/(+n'). Since the true value of dI/dv is $'/(q'+n'—ip), the estimate
overstates the true value. More specifically, the ratio of the sample estimate
(8) to the true value of dI/dv is (4'+—4')/(c' + ri')=1—
Toexpress these as elasticities, let CSr=4'r/Sbe the saving elasticity,
Ir =—4'r/Ibe the investment elasticity and =—n'r/Nbe the elasticity of




— (s/i)Csr — +
+ (N/I)c.
Since S/I is approximatley one and N/I is very close to zero, 8/(dI/dv) is
approximately 1 plus the ratio of E:Sr to Mostempiricalresearch indicates
that this ratio is low and therefore that the relative bias in 8 is small.
3.3 The Regression of Savings on Investment
In an interesting pairofpapers, Jeffrey Sachs (1981a, 1981b) empha-
sized the response of international capital flows to temporaryshiftsin
domestic propensities to invest. Sachs showed that countries that increased
their share of investment in GD? between 1968—73 and 19714_T9 alsoexperienced—28—
substantial increases in net capital inflows, i.e., substantial decreases in net
foreign investment. As a leading example of this, Sachs pointed to the major
flow of capital into Norway that accompanied the Norwegian investment boom
caused by Norway's discovery of North Sea oil.
Equation 26 is typical of the type of results reported by Sachs:23
NFl 1 = —0.227—0.561
L
Y i (0.039) (o.i)48)
(26)
R =o.1&6
where (NFI/Y) denotes the average NFI/Y ratio in country i in 197)4—79 minus
that ratio in 1968—73 and (i/y) denotes the corresponding change in the invest-
ment ratio. The paramenter estimate implies that one "dollar" increase in
domestic investment is associated with a net capital inflow of 0.56 dollars.
Thus, treating I/Y as the independent variable appears to imply that net capital
flows play a such more significant role.
It would be wrong, however, to interpret —0.56 as an estimate of
dN/du. Unless the model is recursive with investment having no interest
elasticity (+' =0)and no covariance between shifts in dometic investment and
shifts in either saving or foreign investment =
%e
=o),the regression
coefficient will not be an unbiased estimate of dN/du. Since the equation is
based on changes in domestic investment and changes in capital flows, such lack
of covariance is unlikely. If, for example, a change in economic conditions
between the two periods caused not only an exogenous increase in domestic
23The dependent variable in Sachs' equation is actually the current account
balance but results for the current account and for NFl are very similar.—29—
investment but also a shift from foreign investment to domestic investment
>0),the absolute value of the estimated coefficient will overstate
the induced capital inflow.
The ambiguity that results from using the change form of the
regression can be avoided by examining the relation between the level of net
foreign investment and the level of domestic investment. Since net foreign
investment is essentially equal to the excess of domestic saving over domestic
investment, an alternative specification is the regression of the domestic
saving ratio on the domestic investment ratio, i.e., just reversing the left and
right hand variables of equation 1. The finding of a regression coefficient
significantly less than one irrp1ies that intercountry differences in investment
are associated with international capital flows to finance that investment.2
For the final five years of the data (l9T'—T9), the results with such
a specification support Sachs' view. The regression coefficient in the
regression of SlY on I/Y is 0.66 with a standard error of O.iI. Thken at face
value, this implies that each extra dollar of exogenous domestic investment
induces a capital inflow of 3 cents.25
The most recent five years are however an unusual subperiod. For the
entire twenty year period, the regression of S/Y on i/Y is O.9 with a standard
error of 0.13. The point estimate thus implies that each dollar of additional
domestic investment is associated with a net capital inflow of only 6 cents;
with a standard error of 13 cents, this is clearly not significantly different
2l4There are of course still identification problems in interpreting the
regression coefficient as an estimate of dS/du (and therefore making inferences
about d(S—I)/du) but these are similar to the ones discussed in sections 3.1 and
32.
25See the previous footnote.—30--
from zero. Similarly, for the decade of the 1960s the regression of SlY on I/Y
is 1.05 with a standard error of 0.12 while for the first half of the 1970s the
regression coefficient is 0.88 with a standard error of 0.13.
One possible interpretation is that conditions have changed in the
mid—1970s to make international capital flows more sensitive to differences in
yields. To support this one mightpointto the end of the U.S. interest equali—
zation tax in 1974, to the growth of the Eurodollar market and of the OPEC
balances, and to the relaxation of restrictions on portfolio investment that
were occurring in a variety of OECD countries (0.E.C.D., 1980). Nevertheless,
there is also the alternative possibility that the regression coefficient for
this brief period provides a biased estimate of dS/du because of a temporary
covariance among the "exogenous" saving and investment factors during this unu—
sual period. Only further time will tell.
It is clear, however, that for the previous fifteen years, the
regressions of SLY on I/Y as yell as the regressions of' I/Y on S/Y support the
conclusion that higher levels of domestic investment do not induce foreign capi-
tal inflows but can only be financed by domestic saving.
4. Portfolio Adjustment and Capital Flows in the Long Run andtheShort Run
Theanalysis of section 3 indicates that the regression estimates are
morerelevant as a guide to the long—run response of international capital xve—
ments to changes in domestic savings and investment than to theirshort—run
response.Coefficient estimates based on annual variations in savings and
investment aresubjectto potentially severe simultaneous eq.uatiOn bias that is
not present when annual observations are averaged over a decade or more and the
regressionis estimated with a cross—country sample of these averages. The—31—
empirical estimates based on such data that were presented in sections 1 and 2
imply that, for the 1960s and 1970s as a whole, higher savings rates induce
higher rates of domestic investment but virtually no increase in net foreign
investment.
The behavior of capital flows in the short run may be quite different.
Although the empirical analysis of sections 1 and 2 is not directly relevant,
theoretical considerations suggest that the short—run response of international
capital flows to changes in domestic saving may be much greater than the long—
run response. The essential reason for this is that the short—run capital flow
is part of a once—for—all adjustment of the international portfolio. When the
adjustment is complete, the rate of capital flow returns to a lower level
governed by the rate of growth of the world capital stock and the share of
international assets in the equilibrium portfolio.26
To make these ideas nxre precise, consider an investor who divides his
portfolio between domestic and foreign assets. Domestic assets earn an uncer-
tain return, r, with subjective mean iandsubjective variance a00. Foreign
assets earn an uncertain return, r*, with subjective mean jiandvariance
The covariance between the returns is a. If the investor's preferences
can be summarized by a utility function that is a quadratic function of the
portfolio return, the investor well maximize
E u[pr* +(1-p)r)1=pL*+(1—p)—l,y[p2a +(l—p)2,0+2p(l_p)a0)(2T)
26Although early models of Mundell (1968) and others id notdistinguish bet-
ween the adjustment phase and the steady state flow, the importance of
distinguishing a temporary capital flow as part of a once—for—all capital stock
adjustment has been recognized at least since Branson (1970). See also Branson
(1979), Cumby and Obstfeld (1982), Girton and Henderson (1977) arid Obstfeld (1981).—32—
Where Eisthe expectations operator, p istheproportion of the portfolio
investedabroad, and y >0is a asure of risk aversion.
The first order maximization conditions implies that the optimal pro-
portion invested abroad (*) is:
*= 11*_i(— a)
y(a+ —2a
thedenominatoris y times the variance of r_r* and is therefore unambiguously
positive. The numerator is easier to discuss if we replace a by pAa00where
pis the correlation between r and r* and = the ratio of the foreign




It is clear thateven ifthe foreign expectedreturn exceeds the
domesticreturn (ij*> t), theinvestor may not wish to invest abroad, i.e.,
p* Q This can happen only if (1) there is a positive correlation between
domestic and foreign rates of return (reflecting, for example, the international
business cycle or common long—term trends in productivity and profitability) and
(2) the subjective variance on the foreign return exceeds the subjective
variance on the domestic return. The subjective variance on the foreign return
may be very large because investors lack informationabout the foreign econonw,
its individual firms, accounting practices,etc.27 If p <0,the investor may
27A recent story in the Wall Street Journal reporting from ¶Lkyo summarized
the difficulty that foreign investors have in getting information on Japanese
securities: "A foreigner here once asked a Japanese securities salesman where
to get investment advice, and this is what he was told:
"'Wehave a saying: the
better the English, the worse the analysis," (Marconi, 1982). airopean
investors maydomore portfolio investment in the United States than vice versa
because of the greater ease with whichdetailedinformation can be obtained
about U.S. firms.—33—
be constrained to a corner solution withno foreign investment. It is clear
that since A reflects subjective variances, investorsin two countries may both
decide not to invest in the other's securities.
Conversely, equation 29 implies that p' may begreater than zero even
jf jj*< ii ifforeign investing provides a useful diversification,i.e., if
pA <1.Thus investors in two countriesmay both decide to invest in the
other's securities even if they have accurateassessments of the expected rates
of return.
A sustained increase in the domestic saving rateraises capital inten-
sity at home and thereby depresses the expected rate ofreturn, ii.Thisunam-
biguously raises p", implying that some of the additionalcapital should be
invested abroad.28 If the initialp is negative, however, the increase in p
may still leave the actual p at a constrained corner solution ofp =0.In
this case, domestic investors do not seek to transferany of the additional
saving abroad. The increased domestic savingmay nevertheless lead to an
increase in net foreign investment ifforeign investors respond to the lower
expected return by reducing their overseas investment. Interms of equation 29,
from the point of view of foreign investors iJ hasfallen, causing an unam-
biguous reduction in p". Again, however, if foreign investorswere originally
not investing abroad, the reduction in theexpected return would have no effect.
Thus portfolio considerations alone couldexplain why a change in domestic
saving in one country would have no effect on its netforeign investment.
28m.isunambiguous only because I assume that the increase in domestic
capital has no effect on the variance of the return or the riskaversion
parameter.Ignoring the possibility of corner solutions, a sustained exogenous
increase in domestic saving will, by reducing the expected domestic rate of
return, raise p' and cause a capital outflow. This will be reinforced by
foreign investors who respond to the lower expected return by reducingtheir
overseas investment. The response of p' to the change in iis inversely propor-
tional to y(a + —2o).The greater the risk aversion (y) or the uncer-
tainty about domestic and foreign rates of return (a and ),thesmaller
will be the change in p. Thus, even for countries that do have overseas port-
folio investments, the effect of a change in the expected return ondomestic or
foreign investment may be a relatively small change in the optimalallocation of
assets between home and abroad.
It is useful, however, to divide the response of international invest-
ment into two coonents. rst, a sustained increase in the domestic saving
rate alters i*p and therefore changes p* for both domestic and foreign
investors. There is then a relatively brief period during which portfolios are
readjusted to the new optimalmix.3° During this readjustment there is a relati-
vely large increase in the rate of net foreign investment.The shorter the time
period during which the adjustment occurs, the greaterwill be the rate of net
foreign investment per unit of time. Once the adjustmentis complete, p
remains unchanged. As the national capital stocks at home and abroad grow over
time with the economies, the fraction p will flowabroad.Net foreign invest-
mentduring this steady state growth will be the difference betweenthe steady
29liartman(1980)presents evidence that international capital flows are large
enough toaffect rates of return on U.S. securities but not enough to equalize
returns here and abroad.
30Although such a reallocation should in principle occur instantly,institu-
tional reasons may cause the adjustment to take a year orniDre.—35—
state outflow of funds by domestic investment and the steady state inflow of
funds from foreign investors. Although the evidence of sections 1 and 2 indica-
tes that this long—run response to a sustained shift in domestic saving is quite
small, the short—run response during a brief period of transition could be quite
sustained.
5. Concluding Comments
The evidence and analysis in this paper support the earlier findings
of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) that sustained increases in domestic savings
rates induce approximately equal increases in domestic investment rates.
Although this limited extent of international capital nobility is consistent
with the portfolio model developed in section 1, there are clearly other aspects
of both international portfolio investment and international direct investment
that should be taken into account in explaining the observed mobility.
Government policies establish the framework for private international
investing. Governments of OECD countries have sought to restrict both capital
inflows and capital outflows, including both direct and portfolio investment.
Even the United States, perhaps the most liberal of the OECD countries in its
attitude to capital nvements, restricts the class of institutions that can
invest abroad and thereby reduces the total volume and sensitivity of foreign
investment. It would be useful to examine the capital restriction policies in
detail, to evaluate their effectiveness and to understand the reasons ihy
governments nay choose to restrict international capital movements.31
310ne suchreason, theabilityof foreign governments' to capture the tax reve-
nue of foreign investment, is discussed in Feldstein (1982).—36—
More generally, although net capital flows do not appear to be sen-
sitive to domestic saving rates, a stable pattern of net capital flows exists.
It wouldbedesirable to examine the reasons for this stable pattern and, in
particular, to resolve the puzzling fact that substantial gross capital flows
produces relatively small net capital flows.—37—
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